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PROVIDING ANOTHER LEG TO STAND ON? A QUESTION
OF THE "ZONE OF INTERESTS" IN CHALLENGING AGENCY
DECISION-MAKING UNDER THE AIR POLLUTION
CONTROL ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The Pennsylvania state legislature passed the current version of
the Pennsylvania Air Pollution Control Act (the Act) in 1992, which
then-Governor Bob Casey, Sr. signed into law.' The Act enumer-
ates the duties of the Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP), previously the Department of Environmental Resources, in
regulating the various sources of air pollution in Pennsylvania.2
The Act also describes the circumstances under which a private
party can challenge a decision made by the DEP and the requisite
level of public involvement in the DEP's decision-making process.3
On June 16, 2011, the Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board
(EHB) specifically addressed both standing and public notice
under the Act in Matthews International Corp. v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Protection (Matthews Int'l) .
This case is unique in light of the EHB's analysis of the public no-
tice requirement and the resulting interaction between the stand-
ing and public notice portions of the Act.5
Public accountability is important to both addressing perceived
wrongs in a forum of justice and creating transparency in decision-
making.6 Despite the recognized value of public accountability, the
government can incur only a limited degree of public scrutiny
1. See S.B. 1650, 176th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1992) (passing Penn-
sylvania Air Pollution Control Act into law).
2. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4004 (West, Westlaw through 2012) (describing
DEP's duties to include implementation of Act's provisions throughout Common-
wealth, and oversight and regulation of new projects affecting air pollution levels
in Commonwealth).
3. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 4002, 4006.1, 4010.2 (West, Westlaw through 2012)
(outlining portions of Act at issue in case at bar).
4. See Matthews Int'l Corp. v. Commw. of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 2008-
235-R, 2011 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *1 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Jun. 16, 2011)
(rejecting Matthews' challenge for lack of standing, and concluding public notice
was not required).
5. For a further discussion of the interaction between the standing and public
notice portions of the Pennsylvania Air Pollution Control Act, see infra notes 150-
158 and accompanying text.
6. See Sanford A. Church, A Defense of the "Zone of Interests" Standing Test, 1983
DuKE L.J. 447, 447-48 (characterizing standing tests as crucial mechanism for pub-
lic access to courts).
(303)
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before the scrutiny impedes the government's work to the point of
ineffectiveness.7 Restrictions on the ability to judicially challenge a
governmental action prevent parties who merely dislike an agency's
decision from bogging down courts and hearing boards.8 In addi-
tion, not requiring a public notice or comment period for every
agency action allows the agency to resolve minor issues quickly and
efficiently.9
This Note examines the issues of standing and public notice in
Matthews Int'1 and predicts how the case will affect future applica-
tions of the traditional standing and public notice rules.' 0 Part II of
the Note details the facts of Matthews Int'l, including the arguments
presented by the parties to the EHB." Part III provides a back-
ground to the development of the main legal issues in this case;
specifically, standing to challenge an agency decision and the pub-
lic notice required when an agency issues a decision or new rule.12
Part IV of the Note then discusses the EHB's analysis of those legal
issues in reaching its conclusion in Matthews Int'l.'3 Next, Part V
addresses whether the EHB's analysis was congruent with the previ-
ously established jurisprudence and whether the dissenting opinion
was justified based on that same precedent.14 Finally, Part VI fore-
casts the potential impact of Matthews Int'l in Pennsylvania.' 5
7. See id. at 447 (stating zone of interests test prevents abuse ofjudicial system
while still providing access to courts for citizens with good faith claims).
8. See Sheldon K. Rennie, Bennett v. Plenert: Using the Zone-Of-Interests Test to
Limit Standing Under the Endangered Species Act, 7 ViLL. ENvrL. L.J. 375, 378 (1996)
(outlining specific requirements for standing as: specific violation of plaintiffs le-
gally-protected interest, causal connection between injury and challenged action,
and likeliness favorable decision will redress injury).
9. See Royal C. Gardner, Public Participation and Wetlands Regulation, 10 UCLA
J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 6-7 (1991) (explaining why Congress created exceptions to
public notice requirement in Administrative Procedure Act).
10. For a detailed analysis on the standing and public notice issues in Mat-
thews Int'l v. DEP, see infra notes 33-124 and accompanying text. For an impact
analysis on the decision in this case, see infra notes 159-178 and accompanying
text.
11. For an explanation of the factual background of Matthews Intl see infra
notes 16-32 and accompanying text.
12. For a background of the main issues addressed in Matthews Intl, see infra
notes 33-97 and accompanying text.
13. For further discussion of the EHB's analysis of the main issues in Matthews
Int ' see infra notes 98-124 and accompanying text.
14. For an examination of the consistency of the EHB's analysis, see infra
notes 125-127 and accompanying text.
15. For an exploration of the potential impact of Matthews Int', see infra notes
159-178 and accompanying text.
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II. FACTS
Matthews International Corporation (Matthews) "is a publicly
traded company that produces cremation and burial equipment,"
and has a division in Pittsburgh that manufactures bronze memo-
rial products.16 In March 2008, privately owned Granite Resources
Corporation (Granite), one of Matthews's competitors in the Pitts-
burgh area, filed a Request for Determination of Requirement for a
Plan Approval/Operating Permit with the DEP to build a new facil-
ity in nearby Aliquippa, Pennsylvania.' 7 The facility would be used
to form and surface coat bronze plaques, which serve as memorial
markers in cemeteries) 8 In its request to the DEP, Granite sought
to have the facility designated as a minor source of air contamina-
tion to "exempt [the facility] from plan approval and operating per-
mit requirements."' 9
Under Pennsylvania's air quality regulations, a facility can be
exempt from the normal procedures and permit requirements
under the Air Pollution Control Act and accompanying regulations
if its air emissions are below a certain level.20 After reviewing Gran-
ite's request, the DEP determined the proposed facility posed "mi-
nor significance" to the air quality in the area and exempted the
facility from the normal regulations and requirements. 2' Matthews
sought to reverse this determination and appealed the DEP's deci-
sion, claiming it was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
and contrary to the law."22 In response, the DEP and Granite ar-
gued that Matthews did not have standing to bring the challenge
16. Matthews Int'l Corp. v. Commw. of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 2008-
235-R, 2011 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *2 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Jun. 16, 2011)
(illustrating Matthews International Corporation's business and profile within pro-
duction industry).
17. Id. at *2 (describing Granite Resource Corporation and events leading up
to litigation).
18. Id. (recounting purpose of Granite's new facility is to as producing bronze
plaque for use as memorial markers).
19. Id. at *2-3 (detailing Granite's request that DEP exempt new facility from
normal requirements of Air Pollution Control Act).
20. Id. at *3 (assessing how pertinent regulations addressed Granite's request
through exemptions for facilities not producing high levels of pollution); see also
25 PA. CODE § 127.14 (West, Westlaw through 2012) (specifying exemptions to
plan approval, including sources determined to be of minor significance by DEP).
21. Matthews Int'l, 2011 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *3 (indicating DEP's grant of
Granite's request to exempt its new facility from plan approval requirements).
22. Id. (recounting Matthews' response to DEP's decision through Matthews's
subsequent appeal to EHB).
2012] 305
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and DEP's action did not require public notice before becoming
final.23
In its final brief submitted to the EHB, Matthews's attorneys
argued the company had standing to challenge the decision be-
cause its interests in the business of its competition were within the
"zone of interests" of the Act.2 4 The brief further stated the Act
"expressly includes protection of competitive interests."25 In addi-
tion, Matthews's attorneys argued, "Matthews is a member of the
public and is entitled to, but did not receive, notice and opportu-
nity for comment" on the EHB's decision and "[t] his interest is dis-
tinct and separate from its interest as a competitor and alone is
enough to confer standing."26
The DEP refuted the claim that Matthews had standing based
on competitive interests alone.27 In fact, the DEP's brief averred
that competitive interests were not within the zone of interests the
state legislature attempted to protect in the Act.2 8 "The only eco-
nomic policy related item mentioned is a collective one of fostering
the 'development, attraction and expansion of industry, commerce
and agriculture.' Individual economic interests are not
mentioned."29
In the end, the EHB agreed with the DEP and dismissed Mat-
thews's suit for lack of standing.30 Specifically, the majority agreed
23. Id. (outlining DEP and Granite's argument that Matthews did not have
standing and public notice requirements did not apply).
24. See Appellant's Response to Dep't of Envtl. Protection's Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of
Standing at 2, Matthews Int'l, 2011 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40 (No. 2008-235-R), available
at http://ehb.courtapps.com/public/documentshower-pub.php?csName
ID=3716 (arguing why Matthews had standing to challenge DEP action).
25. See id. (presenting appellant's argument regarding competitive interests
to EHB).
26. Compare Appellant's Response at 2-3 (arguing Matthews had standing on
both competitive interest and public notice grounds), with Dep't ofEnvtl. Protection's
Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Standing of Appellant Matthews Int'l Corp. at 5-12, Matthews
Int'l, 2011 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40 (No. 2008-235-R), available at http://ehb.
courtapps.com/public/document-shower-pub.php?csNamelD=3 7 16 (noting ap-
pellant argued standing based on public comment requirement, while DEP's Mo-
tion did not discuss public comment requirement).
27. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 7-13, Matthews Int', 2011 Pa. Envirn.
LEXIS 40 (No. 2008-235-R) (refuting Matthews had standing to challenge DEP
action).
28. See id. at 12 (explaining why Matthews' claim did not meet zone of inter-
ests test).
29. See id. at 9 (describing which statutory language supports DEP's argument
and why).
30. See Matthews Int'l, 2011 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *15-16 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing
Bd. Jun. 16, 2011) (dismissing appeal for lack of standing and no public comment
requirement applied for specific DEP action at issue).
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with the DEP's argument that competitive interests were not among
the protected interests outlined in the Act, and thus did not meet
the zone of interests test.3 1 Additionally, the majority concluded
the DEP was not required by either statute or regulation to provide
public notice or opportunity to comment on its decision approving
Granite's request for an exemption from the normal permitting
requirements. 32
III. BACKGROUND
A. In the Zone (of Interests)
Pennsylvania law requires an appealing party have a certain
level of interest in an agency's decision, especially decisions made
by the DEP or other state agencies.33 According to the jurisdiction
provisions of the Environmental Hearing Board Act, persons chal-
lenging an action by the DEP must be "adversely affected" by the
action in order to have standing.34 This language is consistent with
standing tests applied in both federal and state courts.35
On the federal level, the test for standing was first aimed at the
average citizen, as broadly outlined by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Mellon (Mellon).36
In Mellon, the appealing parties challenged a federal law that they
argued took away the states' powers and the citizens' rights to due
process.37 In particular, the appellants argued that because the fed-
31. See id. at *10-12 (explaining competitive interests not included in zone of
interests).
32. See id. at *15 (finding public notice not required by statute or regulation).
33. See id. at *4 (citing Valley Creek Coal. v. Commw. of Pa., Dep't of Envtl.
Prot., No. 98-228-MG, 1999 WL 1295113 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Dec. 15, 1999)
(stating purpose of standing doctrine is "to determine whether the appellant is the
appropriate party to seek relief from a Department action").
34. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7514(c) (West, Westlaw through 2012) (describing
when DEP can take action on orders, permits, licenses, or decisions). The DEP
may:
take an action initially without regard to 2 Pa.C.S. Ch. 5 Subch. A, but no
action of the department adversely affecting a person shall be final as to
that person until the person has had the opportunity to appeal the action
to the board under subsection (g). If a person has not perfected an ap-
peal in accordance with the regulations of the board, the department's
action shall be final as to the person.
Id.
35. For further information on the standing tests applied by federal and
Pennsylvania state courts, see supra notes 36-62 and accompanying text.
36. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 447 (1923) (addressing stand-
ing for average citizen).
37. See id. at 479-80 (indicating appellants' argument that the laws in question
take away citizens' basic rights).
2012] 307
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eral government used taxpayer dollars to implement the federal
law, taxpayers should have standing to challenge the validity of the
law in question.38 Because the statute in question affected such a
vast number of taxpayers, the Court ruled the right to challenge did
not apply to all taxpayers.39 In order to have standing, a citizen
must show he or she incurred a more direct injury from the statute
in question.40
The Supreme Court first firmly established the zone of inter-
ests test to determine which plaintiffs can challenge agency deci-
sions in relation to a particular statute in the 1970 case Ass'n. ofData
Processing Seru. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp (Camp).41 The appellants chal-
lenged a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency stating, "[A]s
an incident to their banking services, national banks[ ] . . . may
make data processing services available to other banks and to bank
customers." 42 The Court allowed the challenge by founding the
statute's general policies identified a specific group of people who
could challenge actions taken in pursuit of enforcing the statute. 43
Specifically, the Court declared the issue of standing concerned
"whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated
by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."44
More than twenty-five years later, the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the zone of interests test in Bennett v. Spear (Spear).45 In
Spear, citizens challenged an Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) ruling under the Endangered Species Act regarding the use
of reservoir water to protect local species of fish.4 6 The Court per-
mitted the citizens' suit because their claims were within the zone
38. See id. at 486 (illustrating why appellants feel citizens have been aggrieved
and have standing to challenge statute).
39. See id. at 487-88 (explaining overload on courts if all taxpayers could chal-
lenge unfavorable laws).
40. See id. at 488 (outlining standing of average citizen).
41. See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54
(1970) (depicting zone of interests test and what interests generally include).
42. See id. at 151 (illustrating ruling in dispute by allowing appellants' data
processing services can be provided to local banks and their customers by national
banks).
43. See id. at 157-58 (explaining applicability of statutes in question to
appellants).
44. See id. at 153 (interpreting of standing determinations).
45. See generally Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (upholding zone of
interests test).
46. See id. at 158-59 (indicating Interior Department's decision to minimize
Klamath Project water levels as reason why appellants filed suit).
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of interests specified in the Endangered Species Act.4 7 The Court
held specific provisions of any given statute would determine which
interests the statute protected and thus, which persons may chal-
lenge an agency action under the statute.4 8 Further, the Court
stated the zone of interests test was generally satisfied in citizen suits
brought under environmental statutes that authorize such suits by
"any person." '
In Pennsylvania, the state courts have used the Supreme
Court's zone of interest test to determine which plaintiffs have
standing to bring suit.50 In 1975, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania determined a plaintiff must have a "substantial interest" in
order to have standing in William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of
Pittsburgh (William Penn Parking Garage).51 Under the substantial in-
terest requirement, the plaintiff must demonstrate some "discerni-
ble adverse effect" to an interest directly resulting from an agency
action that is different from a general interest shared by all citi-
zens. 52 In William Penn Parking Garage, the appellants challenged a
city ordinance "imposing a tax on all patrons of 'non-residential
parking places.' 5 3 Ultimately, the court did not uphold the appel-
lants' challenge because the elected body that issued the ordinance
did not exceed its authority.54 The court also stated the aggrieved
party's interest must be directly related to the underlying policies
protected by the specific law in question.55
In 1984, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania invoked the zone
of interests test in Upper Bucks County Vocational-Technical School Edu-
cation Ass'n v. Upper Bucks County Vocational Technical School Joint
47. See id. at 175-77 (determining appellants' claim of commercial interest in
Interior Department's choice of action as meeting zone of interests test).
48. See id. at 162 (defining when grievances fall within zone of interests test).
"[A] plaintiffs grievance must arguably fall within the zone of interests protected
or regulated by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee invoked in the
suit." Id.
49. See id. at 165-66 (stating statutory provisions allowing "any person" to
bring suit should be interpreted liberally).
50. For further analysis of the Pennsylvania courts' use of the zone of interests
tests, see infta notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
51. See William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269, 282
(Pa. 1975) (describing substantial interest).
52. See id. at 282, 286 (describing "direct" and "immediate" interests).
53. See id. at 275 (articulating why suit was initially filed).
54. See id. at 294-95 (explaining courts' power to adjudicate taxation matters
passed into law by elected bodies).
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Committee (Upper Bucks County Vocational-Technical School). 56 A teach-
ers union challenged the local vocational school joint committee's
decision to reduce the length of the school year due to a recent
union strike.5 7 The court used the zone of interests test to con-
clude the teachers, acting as taxpayers, did not have standing to
challenge the ruling.5 8 Similarly, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court applied the test in the 1993 case Nernberg v. City of Pittsburgh
(Nernberg).6' In Nernberg, the appellants appealed the Pittsburgh
City Council's approval for the construction of student housing
near their residential apartments.60 Ultimately, the court dismissed
the case because the statute in question did not give the appellants
standing. 61
The EHB has also used a variation of the zone of interests test
to determine whether an appellant can challenge a DEP action
under the various statutes. 62 The EHB first established in Wurth v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Protection
(Wurth) 63 and Township of Florence v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
Department of Environmental Protection (Township Of Florence)64 that in
order to have standing to challenge an action taken by the DEP, an
appellant must have been "aggrieved" by that action. 65 Wurth in-
56. See Upper Bucks Cnty. Vocational-Technical Sch. Educ. Ass'n v. Upper
Bucks Cnty. Vocational-Technical Sch. Joint Comm., 474 A.2d 1120, 1120 (Pa.
1984) (invoking zone of interests test).
57. Id. at 1120-22 (explaining factual background of case, including teachers'
strike and subsequent decision by joint committee to shorten school year). The
strike was resolved by the time of the ruling. Id.
58. Id. at 1123 (stating statute's benefit to teachers was incidental and not
meant to be protective).
59. See Nernberg v. Pittsburgh, 620 A.2d 692, 694-95, 697 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1993) (reaffirming governing status of zone of interests test).
60. Id. at 693 (explaining Pittsburgh City Council's decision to approve hous-
ing construction as rationale behind appellants suit).
61. See id. at 696 (agreeing with lower court's analysis that statute did not
protect competitive interests).
62. For further analysis of the EHB's past decisions regarding standing, see
infra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
63. Wurth v. Commw. of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 98-179-MG, 2000 WL
294469, at *9 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Feb. 29, 2000) (requiring appellant have
substantial interest in litigation, which was greater than general citizens' interest in
law enforcement).
64. Twp. of Florence v. Commw. of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 96-045-MG,
1997 WL 588978, at *6 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Aug. 26, 1997) (characterizing
need for substantial, direct, and immediate interest in DEP's action as essential
requirement to show aggrieved claimant).
65. See Wurth, 2000 WL 294469 at *9 (citing William Penn Parking Garage,
Inc. v. Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269, 282 (Pa. 1975)) (stating aggrieved party must
show direct harm with causal relation from challenged action); see also Twp. of Flo-
rence, 1997 WL 588978 at *6 (citing William Penn Parking Garage, 346 A.2d at 280)
8
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol23/iss2/5
PROVIDING ANOTHER LEG TO STAND ON?
volved the reissuance of a landfill permit to a private operator, with
the EHB concluding the appellant did not have a sufficiently direct
injury to establish standing. 66 In Township of Florence, the EHB dis-
missed the appeal of an air quality plan approval for the expansion
of a municipal solid waste landfill because the appellant did not
adequately demonstrate an interest in the outcome of the DEP's
decision.67
In the last decade, the EHB supplemented the zone of interests
test with a more specific standing requirement, as illustrated in
Pennsylvania Trout Unlimited v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection (Pennsylvania Trout) .68 Pennsylvania
Trout involved the DEP's issuance of a water obstruction and en-
croachment permit for the construction of a shopping mall.6 9 The
EHB ultimately found the DEP's decision had enough of a direct
and adverse effect on the appellants to grant them standing.70
While the test outlined by Pennsylvania Trout is similar to the zone
of interests test, the opinion does not specifically mention any statu-
tory provisions.7' Further, the EHB has directly applied the Su-
preme Court's analysis from Camp in other decisions regarding
standing. 72 Because both the Supreme Court of the United States
(emphasizing need to show substantial, direct, immediate interest in agency
decision).
66. Wurth, 2000 WL 294469 at *1 (providing procedural posture).
67. See Twp. of Florence, 1997 WL 588978 at *1 (explaining appeal was denied
for not demonstrating direct, immediate, and substantial interest in DEP action).
68. See Pa. Trout v. Commw. of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 2002-251-R, 2003
WL 22321705, at *1-2 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Sept. 24, 2003) (describing essential
elements for standing).
69. See id. at *1 (portraying DEP's issuance of water obstruction and encroach-
ment permit to construction and development group as reason for appeal).
70. See id. at *4-6 (holding appellants had standing because appellant group's
members regularly used and enjoyed area in question and had future plans to use
and enjoy the area).
71. See id. at *2 (citing Giordano v. Commw. of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No.
99-204-L, 2000 WL 1506957, (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Oct. 4, 2000)) (outlining EHB
test for standing as disputed action having, or will have, adverse effects, and appel-
lants are among those to feel effects).
In order to establish standing, the appellants must prove that (1) the ac-
tion being appealed has had - or there is an objectively reasonable threat
that it will have - adverse effects, and (2) the appellants are among those
who have been - or are likely to be - adversely affected in a substantial,
direct, and immediate way [citations omitted] .... The second question
cannot be answered affirmatively unless the harm suffered by the appel-
lants is greater than the population at large (i.e. "substantial") and there
is a direct and immediate connection between the action under appeal
and the appellants' harm (i.e. causation in fact and proximate cause).
Id.
72. See McCutcheon v. Commw. of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Res., No. 94-096-W,
1995 WL 24326, at *2 (Pa. Envti. Hearing Bd. Jan. 5, 1995) (holding appellant did
2012] 311
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and Pennsylvania common law apply nearly identical standards to
determine standing for appellants, the EHB uses both standards
interchangeably.7 3
B. Informing the Public
In Matthews Int'l, the question of standing was related to the Air
Pollution Control Act's public notice requirement, which provides
standing to those who comment on a DEP action during the re-
quired public comment period.74 The Act also requires the DEP to
give public notice when it intends to approve a plan of construction
or modification and issue a permit.75 Further, the regulations
promulgated by the DEP under the Act also require public notice
when changing the exemption list-a list of qualifying sources of
minor significance and physical changes of minor significance to
sources.76
The Supreme Court previously addressed the public notice re-
quirement as it relates to agency actions under the Administrative
Procedure Act.77 The Natural Resources Defense Council chal-
lenged the Atomic Energy Commission's decision to grant a power
company a license to operate a nuclear facility in Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (Vermont Yan-
kee).78 The Court ruled in favor of the power company because it
followed all of the proper procedures in granting the license.79 In
not have standing because statute did not protect appellant's private enterprise
interests over others).
73. For further discussion of the Supreme Court and Pennsylvania courts'
analyses of standing, see supra notes 36-61 and accompanying text.
74. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4010.2 (West, Westlaw through 2012) (specifying
who has standing to appeal DEP action). "Any person who participated in the
public comment process for a plan approval or permit shall have the right, within
thirty (30) days from actual or constructive notice of the action, to appeal the
action to the hearing board . . . ." Id.
75. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4006.1(b) (1) (West, Westlaw through 2012) (clari-
fying when DEP must provide public notice relating to permits). "The department
shall provide public notice and the right to comment on all permits prior to issu-
ance or denial and may hold public hearings concerning any permit." Id.
76. See 25 PA. CODE § 127.14(d) (West, Westlaw through 2012) (detailing
when DEP must give public notice in relation to sources of minor significance and
physical changes of minor significance to sources).
77. See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 195-96 (1993) (outlining Administrative
Procedure Act's public notice requirements); see also Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 542 (1978) (noting
importance of assuring due process for aggrieved individuals).
78. See Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 519 (specifying agency's grant of nuclear
license as why petitioner challenged).
79. See id. at 557-58 (explaining why majority disagreed with Court of Appeal
for District of Columbia's ruling in favor of petitioner).
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cases where an agency is making a "quasi-judicial" determination
that affects a limited number of people, certain additional proce-
dures may be required to afford due process to other interested
parties.80
The Court further addressed the public notice requirement in
Lincoln v. Vigil (Lincoln).*81 In Lincoln, the petitioners challenged
the Indian Health Service's decision to cancel a regional health
care program in order to reallocate resources for a nationwide pro-
gram.8 2 At that time, the Court established the circumstances
under which the "notice-and-comment" requirement must be en-
forced, as well as the exceptions to the requirement.88 Ultimately,
the Court ruled the Indian Health Service's decision did not violate
the obligations stated in the agency's enabling act.84
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court specifically addressed
the public notice provisions of the Act in Soil Remediation Systems,
Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection.85 The appellant chal-
lenged the DEP's denial of their request to extend an air pollution
control plan approval.86 After the EHB dismissed the initial appeal,
the court reversed and stated the appellant did not have adequate
notice of the DEP's denial.8 7 The court held the DEP must follow
all procedures outlined in the Act to properly meet the public no-
tice requirement.88 The court determined there was a reasonable
chance of depriving the appellant of the opportunity to become
fully availed of the appeal process if the DEP either failed to follow
the requirement entirely or if it claimed to have met the require-
80. See id. at 542 (indicating when additional measures are needed in
rulemaking decisions to assure due process for affected individuals).
81. See Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 184, 189 (narrating respondent children's argu-
ment that agency decision violated public notice-and-comment requirements of
Administrative Procedure Act).
82. See id. (explaining respondent's challenge to discontinuation of direct
clinical services through Indian children's program).
83. See id. at 196 (stating notice requirement applies when agency makes "leg-
islative" or "substantive" rules, but not rules regarding internal agency matter not
affecting general public).
84. See id. at 199 (distinguishing from cases used by Tenth Circuit to rule in
favor of petitioners).
85. See Soil Remediation Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 703 A.2d 1081, 1083
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997) (specifying public notice provisions of Air Pollution Con-
trol Act as basis of main issue).
86. See id. at 1082 (illustrating DEP's dealings with appellant regarding re-
quest for extension of plan approval as basis for appeal).
87. See id. at 1084 (reversing EHB's decision because DEP's advance notice
letter did not properly constitute notice under the Act).
88. See id. (recognizing appeal process may commence only after DEP deter-
mination is final and affected parties receive notice).
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ment through alternative means that were unknown or confusing
to the appellant.89
In an opinion written by then-Chief Judge and current DEP
Secretary Michael Krancer, the EHB most recently laid out the test
to determine if there was adequate public notice and participation
in Ainjar Trust v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection (Ainjar Trust) .90 Ainjar Trust involved a chal-
lenge to the DEP's approval of an Act 537 sewage-planning module,
which was ultimately upheld by the EHB.9' Ultimately, the deter-
mining factor was whether the appellant had "access" to the ap-
pealed action in order "to comment on [it]. "92
Despite this encouragement to provide the public with notice,
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has held that in determin-
ing whether public notice is required in a given situation, the stat-
ute in question must specifically state such a requirement applies.93
Neither the EHB nor a court can require public notice when such a
provision is not clearly included in the applicable statute, a rule
emphasized by the Commonwealth Court in Presock v. Department of
Military and Veterans Affairs (Presock).94 The Department of Military
and Veterans Affairs' terminated a paralyzed veteran's pension,
from which the veteran appealed arguing the statute did not re-
quire a "loss of use" of his extremities to be a "total" inability to use
his extremities.95 The court reversed the termination decision and
determined the veteran was not required to show "absolute [ly] no
use of the arms and legs," as the Department of Military and Veter-
89. See id. (stating "advance copy" of final decision letter could reasonably be
interpreted to not be final action from which appeal could begin).
90. See Ainjar Trust v. Commw. of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 99-248-K,
2001 WL 1335018, at *28-30 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Oct. 10, 2001) (articulating
opinion written by Michael Krancer that held appellant had adequate notice of
project and was able to participate in decision-making process).
91. See id. at *28 (summarizing challenge to whether adequate notice and op-
portunity to participate was provided and subsequent EHB ruling in favor of DEP).
92. See id. at *28 (quoting Green Thornbury Comm. v. Commw. of Pa., Dep't
of Envtl. Res., No. 93-271-W, 1995 WL 348012, at *16 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. May
25, 1995)) (finding adequate access to module as determining factor).
93. See Presock v. Dept. of Military and Veterans Affairs, 855 A.2d 928, 931
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (stating despite encouragement to liberally construe stat-
utes, words cannot essentially be added to statute in lieu of interpreting statute as
written).
94. See id. at 931 (specifying extent ofjudicial interpretation of statute). "Any
omitted words may not be supplied in interpreting provisions of a statute." Id.
95. See id. at 930 (indicating Department of Veterans' Affairs termination of
Presock's pension was catalyst for appeal).
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ans Affairs had insisted.96 Such an interpretation, the court con-
cluded, improperly added the word "total" to the statutory
definition of "loss of use."97
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
After hearing arguments presented from both sides, the EHB
concluded Matthews had no legal basis to bring the challenge and
dismissed the suit.9 8 The EHB ruled Matthews did not have proper
standing under the Air Pollution Control Act to bring the chal-
lenge.99 It also found Matthews's claim that the DEP failed to abide
by the proper public notice requirement lacked merit.100
The EHB's opinion principally discussed the issue of whether
Matthews had standing to bring the challenge.101 The majority re-
lied on its precedent to ascertain the standing rules to determine
whether the appeal would go forward. 0 2 The majority also drew on
various facets of the standing doctrines developed by the Supreme
Court of the United States and Pennsylvania courts.103 The EHB
first addressed whether Matthews was an aggrieved party as a result
of the DEP's decision.104 In doing so, the majority specifically re-
lied on earlier EHB decisions, such as Wurth, Township of Florence,
and Pennsylvania Trout, to determine if Matthews had a threatened
"substantial" interest, and if that interest was "direct" and "immedi-
ate" to the action in question.105 In order to clarify the specific
interests required for standing, the majority turned to the Supreme
96. See id. at 931-32 (holding Department's interpretation of statute was not
consistent with statute's wording).
97. See id. at 932 (reversing because Department's termination of benefits was
based on improper interpretation of statute).
98. See Matthews Int'l Corp. v. Commw. of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 2008-
235-R, 2011 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *15 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Jun. 16, 2011)
(dismissing appeal after determining Matthews did not have standing and public
notice requirement did not apply).
99. See id. at *6 (determining Matthews did not have standing to challenge
DEP decision).
100. See id. at *15 (dismissing Matthews claim that DEP did not follow public
notice procedures).
101. See id. at *4-12 (explaining EHB's decision on standing issue, specifically
that Matthews's competitive interests did not yield standing to challenge DEP
decision).
102. See id. at *5-6 (analyzing previous EHB cases).
103. See Matthews Int'l, 2011 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *7-8 (discussing major-
ity's analysis of previous state and federal court cases).
104. See id. at *6 (explaining appellant must be "aggrieved" to have standing
to challenge action).
105. See id. (citing Pa. Trout v. Commw. of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 2002-
251-R, 2003 WL 22321705, at *2 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Sept. 24, 2003); Giordano
v. Commw. of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 99-204-L, 2000 WL 1506957, at *1 (Pa.
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Court of Pennsylvania's decisions in William Penn Parking Garage
and Upper Bucks County Vocational-Technical School, as well as the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's subsequent Nernberg decision,
for guidance.106 The EHB also referred to a footnote in the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Camp to illustrate how the state's com-
mon law rules on standing derive from the nation's highest legal
interpretative body.107
In combining these similar determinations, the majority also
used the language of the Act itself to reach its conclusion.108 Mat-
thews claimed that § 4002 (a) (iv) of the Act confirmed the legisla-
ture intended the Act to prevent agency actions from interfering
with individual competitive interests.109 This subsection states it is
the "policy of the Commonwealth" to protect its air resources "to
the degree necessary for the . . . development, attraction and ex-
pansion of industry, commerce and agriculture. .. ."110 The major-
ity rejected Matthews's argument, stating the subsection
"encourage [ed] competition and the expansion of industry," which
was contrary to Matthews's argument.1 1 Matthews also relied on
previous EHB decisions to demonstrate an individual competitive
interest was sufficient to meet the standing requirement. 112 The
majority, however, pointed out that the appellants' interests in
those specific cases were more direct and immediate than the inter-
est Matthews was claiming.113 As a result, the majority deemed Mat-
thews's interest as one the Act did not intend to protect; therefore,
Matthews did not have standing to bring the challenge. 114
Envtl. Hearing Bd. Oct. 4, 2000)) (explaining effect DEP action must have on
appellant for appellant to have standing).
106. See id. at *7-8 (relying on state court cases to explain what interests meet
standing requirement).
107. See id. at *7 (citing Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)) (describing test as zone of interests protected by
statute).
108. See Matthews Int'l, 2011 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *9-10 (explaining major-
ity's use of statutory language to support decision).
109. See id. (specifying provision claimed by Matthews to give it standing
based on its own competitive interests).
110. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4002(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012) (detailing
wording of relevant statutory provision).
111. See Matthews Int'l, 2011 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *10 (interpreting statu-
tory language).
112. See id. (pointing out appellant's argument in support of standing).
113. See id. at *10-11 (distinguishing previous cases supporting argument
from circumstances of present case).
114. Id. at *11-12 (concluding Matthews's competitive interests were not
within Act's zone of interests on the issue of standing).
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Concerning the public notice requirement, the majority once
again turned to the wording of the statute and regulation to deter-
mine whether the DEP's action in this instance required public no-
tice. 115 Matthews contended both the statute and regulation in
question required the DEP to provide public notice and the right to
comment when approving construction and modification plans and
permit requirements.' 1 6 While public notice was required when
the DEP intended to approve the plans and requirements, the ma-
jority did not find such a prerequisite when the DEP ruled on a
determination for an exception to the requirements." 7 According
to Matthews, the public notice and comment requirement should
be in place for the determination of exemptions from normal statu-
tory obligations."18 Yet the majority countered that to do so would
add a provision that did not exist in the statute, which the Com-
monwealth Court previously declared unlawful for courts to do."i9
While the dissent agreed with the majority that an individual
competitive interest did not give an appellant standing to bring a
challenge, it insisted the majority misinterpreted the portion of the
statute regarding the public notice requirement.o20 The dissent as-
serted the public notice requirement was broader than the major-
ity's interpretation, and concluded the statute did require public
notice for this type of action.12' It reasoned that because the stat-
ute gave the right of appeal to those who participated in the notice
and comment process, and process was denied in this case, the stat-
ute gave the right to appeal to those who would have participated in
115. See id. at *12-15 (using Act's language and language of subsequent regu-
lations regarding when public notice is required and when a person may challenge
DEP action to resolve public notice issue).
116. See Matthews Int'l, 2011 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *12 (providing Mat-
thews's argument that it did not receive notice or ample time to comment).
117. Id. (noting no statutory provision requires notice when granting exemp-
tions under rules).
118. Id. at *13 (explaining resulting inconsistency if Matthews's interpretation
of public notice requirement were accepted).
119. Id. at *13-14 (utilizing Presock to explain limitation on judicial interpreta-
tion of statutes). "Even where courts are encouraged to liberally construe statutes
... words may not be added under the guise of interpreting the meaning of the
statute." Id.
120. See id. at *16-18 (Mather, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(differing in opinion on when a person may challenge DEP action and how stand-
ing can be established).
121. See Matthews Int'l, 2011 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *17 (MatherJ., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing statutory provision stating public
comment process requiring opportunity for public comment for plan approvals
and operating permits prior to issuance).
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the public notice and comment period if it had been available. 122
The majority, however, determined the dissent's interpretation
would not only bog down the DEP in carrying out the statute's pro-
visions, but also potentially flood the EHB's docket with cases from
appellants claiming they would have commented had they been
given the opportunity.123 The majority felt this interpretation was
contrary to what the state Legislature intended. 124
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The EHB majority properly interpreted prior case law to arrive
at its conclusion on each of the major issues in Matthews Int'l.125
The Board's conclusions were consistent with both the precedent
set by the Supreme Court of the United States, the Pennsylvania
courts, and the EHB's previous decisions. 26 The EHB's interpreta-
tion of the statutory language, which provides standing to challenge
agency actions to average citizens who make comments, however,
challenges more than thirty-five years of Pennsylvania case law and
nearly ninety years of Supreme Court jurisprudence. 2 7
In addressing the standing issue, the majority relied on the
precedent set by the Supreme Court in Camp.128 The EHB recog-
nized that to have standing, one must have the type of interest the
legislation intended to protect.'29 In Camp, as well as in Penn-
sylvania cases, the interest at stake had to be "among the policies
underlying the legal rule relied upon by the person claiming to be
'aggrieved."'13o The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed the
particular grievance raised in Matthews Int'l, competitive interests,
122. Id. at *17-18 (arguing loss of right to publicly comment gave Matthews
automatic right to appeal).
123. See id. at *15 (majority opinion) (countering dissent's interpretation of
standing in relation to public notice).
124. See id. (arguing dissent's interpretation was inconsistent with intent of
Pennsylvania Legislature).
125. For more information on the majority's interpretation of prior cases, see
supra notes 102-119 and accompanying text.
126. For more information on the precedents used by the EHB in Matthews
Int'l, see supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
127. For further discussion of Supreme Court and Pennsylvania state court
decisions regarding standing, see supra notes 36-61 and accompanying text.
128. For more information on the zone of interests test in Camp, see supra
notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
129. See Matthews Int'l, 2011 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *7-9 (explaining primary
definition of "immediate" interest).
130. For further explanation of Pennsylvania cases upholding the zone of in-
terests test, see supra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
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and held that such an interest would grant standing only if the leg-
islation explicitly protected that interest.131
Further, the majority consistently used several of its prior deci-
sions to supplement the zone of interests test, and confirm that
standing is also contingent on the appellant actually being an ag-
grieved party.132 The precise test for what constitutes an aggrieved
party was previously outlined on more than one occasion and again
used in Matthews Int'l.s33 This supplemental test is consistent with
the established Pennsylvania case law in William Penn Parking Ga-
rage, and also with the case law set by the Supreme Court in Mel-
lon.134 Through the use of the zone of interests test and the
supplemental aggrieved party test, both of which were established
in precedent more than forty years prior, the majority concluded
the appellant's competitive interests were not among the protected
interests outlined by the Act.135
The majority primarily relied on the language of the Act itself
to determine whether the DEP violated the requirements for public
notice and whether the appellant subsequently gained standing be-
cause of the violation.136 The majority then addressed Matthews's
argument that this situation should be included in the public no-
tice requirements, citing several Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court cases that stated otherwise.' 37 In particular, Presock empha-
sized that even where courts are encouraged to construe statutes
and regulations liberally, words cannot be added where they do not
exist.'13 In the past, the EHB liberally construed the public notice
131. See Upper Bucks Cnty. Vocational-Technical Sch. Educ. Ass'n v. Upper
Bucks Cnty. Vocational-Technical Sch. Joint Comm., 474 A.2d 1120, 1122-23 (Pa.
1984) (asserting benefits and costs incidentally related to legislation or regulation
are not considered within zone of interests).
132. For additional EHB cases stating appellants must be an aggrieved party,
see supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
133. For more information on the specific test to determine who constitutes
an aggrieved party, see supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
134. For further discussion of precedential cases establishing the standing re-
quirement of being directly affected by agency action, see supra notes 36-71 and
accompanying text.
135. For more information on the EHB's analysis of the appellant's standing
claim in Matthews Int'l, see supra notes 109-119 and accompanying text.
136. See Matthews Int'l Corp. v. Commw. of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No.
2008-235-R, 2011 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *12-13 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Jun. 16,
2011) (emphasizing statutory language regarding when public notice is required
and how people can gain standing through public comment process as most perti-
nent to issue).
137. See id. at *13-14 (rejecting appellant's interpretation of statute by citing
precedent from Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court).
138. For a discussion of the Commonwealth Court's construction of the perti-
nent statutory language in Presock, see supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
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requirement in relation to standing by requiring appellants to have
adequate notice of the opportunity to make a public comment.13 9
The subsequent Presock case, however, limited the test to cases
where the public notice requirement is specified in the statute. 140
The majority correctly recognized and applied this limitation in
Matthews Int'l, pointing out the statutory language only required
public notice on the issuance of permits.141 The Act does not re-
quire the DEP to issue public notice when they rule on an exemp-
tion from the Act's permitting requirements.14 2
The dissent, while correct in concurring that Matthews did not
have standing based on competitive interests, incorrectly asserted
that Matthews had standing through the public notice require-
ment.143 The dissent argued that under the Act, "a person has the
right to participate in the public comment process for plan approv-
als and operating permits."144 It then proffered that because Mat-
thews would have participated in the public comment process had
there been one, its objection to its loss of the right to publicly com-
ment was valid, and thus, it gained standing to challenge the ac-
tion.145 This analysis is flawed, however, because the Act neither
requires a public comment process in order to grant exceptions to
permits, nor provides standing for probable participation in the
process.146 The dissent even stated, "A person establishes standing
through the act of participating in the public comment process."1 47
139. For more information on the EHB's past analysis of the public notice
issue, see supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
140. See Presock v. Dep't. of Military and Veterans Affairs, 855 A.2d 928, 931
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (stating omitted words cannot be used to interpret statu-
tory provisions).
141. For more information on the EHB's analysis of the public notice require-
ment in Matthews Int'l, see supra notes 115-124 and accompanying text.
142. See Matthews Int'l Corp. v. Commw. of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No.
2008-235-R, 2011 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *12 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Jun. 16,
2011) (holding statute and corresponding regulation did not require public notice
alleged by appellant).
143. See generally id. at *16-25 (Mather,J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (arguing in dissent that public notice was required, which gave appellant
standing to challenge DEP's action).
144. Id. at *17 (citing 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4006.1(b) (West, Westlaw through
2012)) (describing statutory provision imparting standing on Matthews).
145. See id. at *17-18 (concluding Matthews had standing for appeal).
146. See id. at *12-13 (majority opinion) (citing 25 PA. CODE § 127.14(d)
(West, Westlaw through 2012); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4006.1(b) (West, Westlaw
through 2012)) (explaining statute and regulation do not require public notice
for exemptions to permit requirements or provide standing to parties who would
have participated in public comment process that did not happen).
147. See Matthews Int', 2011 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *17 (Mather, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added) (recognizing participation
in comment period provides standing).
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The dissent essentially admitted that according to the statute, a per-
son must actually participate in the public comment process to have
standing to challenge the action. 48 By arguing otherwise, the dis-
sent tried to do exactly what the majority and case precedent (in-
cluding Presock) prohibited-adding language to the statute that
does not already exist.149
The Matthews Int'l decision, in its entirety, is arguably consis-
tent with the zone of interests test.'50 The EHB cited the Act in
determining "any person who participated in the public comment
process for a plan approval or permit" has standing to appeal the
action to the EHB. 51 Further, such an interpretation does not add
words to the statute, as forbidden by previous Pennsylvania Com-
monwealth Court cases.' 52 The statutory language gives standing to
a person who makes a public comment; thus, those who make pub-
lic comments have an interest in the agency action that is protected
by the statute. 53
This interpretation of the public notice provisions of the Act,
however, undermines the broader principle initially established in
Mellon of precluding standing to just any ordinary citizen. 154 Fur-
ther, Pennsylvania courts have upheld this concept throughout the
development of the zone of interests standing doctrine. 55 This in-
terpretation also overrules the EHB's own recent precedent setting
out the test to establish standing. 56 The test even states the harm
alleged by the appellant must be "greater than the population at
large" and that there must be "a direct and immediate connection
148. See id. at *17 (acknowledging actual participation in public comment
process imparts standing).
149. See Presock v. Dept. of Military and Veterans Affairs, 855 A.2d 928, 931
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (observing words may not be essentially added to statute's
language during course of interpretation).
150. See Matthews Int'l, 2011 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *6-12 (providing details
on various zone of interests tests used in analyzing whether Matthews had standing
to challenge DEP action).
151. Id. at *14 (citing 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4010.2 (West, Westlaw through
2012)) (describing how participating in public notice period grants appellant
standing to appeal agency action).
152. For further analysis of precedent stating that language cannot be added
to a statute, see supra notes 119 and accompanying text.
153. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 4010.2 (West, Westlaw through 2012) (providing
those who participate in public comment process for plan approval or permit with
right to appeal action to EHB within thirty days of notice of action).
154. For more information on Mellon's analysis on granting standing to ordi-
nary citizens, see supra notes 3640 and accompanying text.
155. For more information on Pennsylvania case law reinforcing the Mellon
analysis, see supra notes 50-73 and accompanying text.
156. For more information on previous EHB cases establishing a test for
standing, see supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
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between the action under appeal and the appellant's harm."157
Matthews Int'l is in direct conflict with that test, particularly when
addressing the public notice requirement.158
VI. IMPACT
While the EHB addressed the standing and public notice issues
separately in a reasonable manner, the law generated from the
combined interpretations may have improperly expanded the
grounds for standing in challenging agency actions.15 9 The EHB's
ruling on the standing issue alone was consistently relied upon both
federal and state precedent. 60 Subsequently, its interpretation of
the public notice requirement, which relied mainly on the lan-
guage of the Act itself, arguably created a ground for standing that
would not normally exist under the zone of interests test or the
EHB's previous jurisprudence on the issue.161
In its interpretation of the public notice issue, the majority re-
jected the dissent's argument that anyone who would have partici-
pated in the public comment process, as well as those who actually
did participate, has standing to challenge an agency action.162 The
EHB even went further to specifically state that this particular inter-
pretation was not intended by the legislature when passing the
Act.163 The EHB, however, does not refute the assumption that any
person who participates in the public comment process has stand-
ing.164 Without refuting this assumption, the EHB creates the pos-
sibility that a citizen, not aggrieved by an agency action or within
the zone of interests, has standing to bring a lawsuit against the
157. See Pa. Trout v. Commw. of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 2002-251-R,
2003 WL 22321705, at *2 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Sept. 24, 2003) (describing level
of harm experienced and clarity of causation between harm and agency action
needed for individual to establish standing).
158. For a detailed explanation of the EHB majority's analysis of the public
comment provision, see supra notes 115-124 and accompanying text.
159. For further discussion on how the EHB may have expanded grounds for
standing, see infra notes 101-124 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 101-114 and accompanying text (analyzing standing re-
quirement in Matthews Int'l).
161. See supra notes 115-119 and accompanying text (examining public notice
requirement in light of case at bar).
162. See supra notes 115-124 and accompanying text (interpreting public no-
tice issue).
163. Matthews Int'l Corp. v. Commw. of Pa., Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 2008-
235-R, 2011 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *15 (Pa. Envtl. Hearing Bd. Jun. 16, 2011)
(interpreting legislative intent).
164. See id. at *14-15 (analyzing standing requirement in relation to submit-
ting public comment).
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DEP for a decision the citizen did not like if the person commented
on it.165
At the very least, Matthews Int'l has the potential to create much
confusion as to whether someone has standing to challenge a DEP
action under the Pennsylvania Air Pollution Control Act.16 6 On
one hand, the DEP will use the case to contend an appellant must
be aggrieved, as well as substantially and directly affected, by the
decision in order to have standing to challenge.167 On the other
hand, an appellant will use the case to argue the Act only requires
participation in the public comment process to have standing.' 6 8
Both conclusions are explicit in the opinion, yet they are inherently
contradictory. 169
If the EHB decides participation in the public comment pro-
cess does fall within the Act's zone of interests, it subjects itself to a
heavier caseload. 170 By merely submitting a comment, a citizen
would have standing to challenge an agency action taken under the
Act, provided there was a public comment process.171 This means
more people in general are likely to file challenges before the
Board, leading to unnecessary litigation that ultimately disrupts the
Board from carrying out its duties.172
An expansion of the standing requirements could, however,
promote improved civic involvement from ordinary citizens.17 3 If
ordinary citizens can challenge an agency action subject to the pub-
lic comment process, it is likely more citizens will participate in the
process, even if the purpose involves gaining standing to challenge
165. For further analysis of how average citizens outside the traditional zone
of interests can have standing, see supra notes 150-153 and accompanying text.
166. For further discussion of the confusion created by Matthews Int'l regard-
ing standing, see infra notes 167-169 and accompanying text.
167. See Matthews Int'l, 2011 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *2-6 (discussing each
party's arguments on whether Matthews attained standing to challenge DEP action
based on competitive interests).
168. See id. at *14-15 (analyzing Air Pollution Control Act's public comment
provision in relation to standing).
169. See id. at *6-7, 14 (contradicting own interpretation of zone of interests
test providing higher requirements for standing).
170. See Church, supra note 6, at 449-50 (explaining zone of interests tests and
other standing tests originated to prevent courts from experiencing time-consum-
ing caseloads).
171. For further discussion on how average citizens can have standing by sub-
mitting comments, see supra note 153 and accompanying text.
172. See Church, supra note 6, at 447 (explaining zone of interests test pre-
vents abuse ofjudicial system while providing those with good faith claims access to
court).
173. See Rennie, supra note 8, at 375-76 (stating Congress generally en-
couraged citizen suits in environmental statutes, yet subsequent standing tests im-
posed by courts restrict these suits).
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the action if dissatisfied with the result.174 Consequently, the more
people that have standing to challenge such a DEP action, the more
the DEP would be inclined to consider public comments before
promulgating a new rule or issuing a permit.175
Because this decision was issued at the EHB level, it only affects
future cases that come before the EHB.' 7 6 Further, the case is
mandatory legal guidance for only EHB cases involving standing
under the Air Pollution Control Act and the public notice require-
ment.'77 Despite the limited immediate legal effect of Matthews
Int'l, the potential legal loophole to the zone of interests test cre-
ated by the case could possibly broaden the standing requirement
for other similarly worded statutes.' 78
Bill Welkowitz*
174. See id. at 399 (stating creating'additional elements for standing deter
"worthy plaintiffs" from seeking "valid legal interests").
175. See Gardner, supra note 9, at 1 (quoting S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT, at 19-20 (1948)) (explaining importance of public participation in rulemak-
ing). "[Public] participation ... in the rule-making process is essential in order to
permit administrative agencies to inform themselves and to afford safeguards to
private interests." Id.
176. See 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7514(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012) (explain-
ing effective scope of EHB decision making as limited to actions and decisions
made by DEP).
177. See id. at § 7514(a)-(b) (explaining specific types of cases Board
adjudicates).
178. For further discussion on how Matthews Int'l could broaden standing for
similarly worded statutes, see supra notes 150-153 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Villanova University School of Law; B.S.J., 2006,
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